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CHAPTER 13 
Torts 
WARREN A. SEAVEY 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§13.I. Negligence: Liability for acts of independent contractor. 
In Todd v. Wernick 1 the defendant, a building owner, employed an 
independent contractor to tar'the flat roof of his apartment house. 
The contractor used a boom supported on a tripod to raise the ma-
terials by a pulley and rope. The boom was kept from falling by a 
counterweight consisting of a removable 75-pound pail of sand. The 
accident resulted while the plaintiff, a seven-year-old tenant, was on 
a walk beside the building which was provided for tenants' use and 
over which the boom extended. Childishly, she seized the end of the 
rope left dangling by the workmen and, because the counterweight 
had been removed, caused the boom to fall upon her. Judgment 
for the defendant was entered n.o.v. by the trial court and affirmed 
on the ground that ont! employing a competent independent contractor 
is not liable for negligence in the operative details of the work, unless 
thefe is inherent danger in the work even if properly performed. 
The principle underlying this decision is in accordance with all 
previous Massachusetts cases - those cited by the Supreme Judicial 
Court and many others. One who employs an independent contractor 
to do work which necessarily involves a peculiar risk of harm to others 
unless special precautions are taken is under a duty to see that such 
precautions are taken; he is not, however, liable for harm resulting 
from negligence in the operative details.2 
It is arguable that the situation was within the area in which the 
jury's decision should be final. The liability for the negligence of an 
independent contractor is not limited to ultrahazardous activities, al-
though it exists only where there are inherent risks greater than in 
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§13.1. 1334 Mass. 624, 138 N.E.2d 124 (1956). 
22 Restatement of Torts §§416, 426. 
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§13.2 TORTS 91 
ordinary actIvItIes. In this case, the expected operation involved 
hoisting heavy weights above a passageway for tenants, and the pre-
cautions should have included a better method of securing the boom. 
The fault was not merely in an operative detail, but in using a re-
movable counterweight. The result is not, however, out of line with 
previous Massachusetts cases, falling perhaps between the case in 
which it was held that the owner of a building was not liable for the 
negligence of a contractor employed to repair a chimney, from which 
a brick fell upon a passerby,3 and the case in which the owner of a 
building was held liable for the fault of a contractor in removing a 
massive stone balustrade adjacent to the street.4 It may be said, 
further, that in a matter which involves the rule as to the liability for 
acts of an independent contractor, the jury cannot well appreciate 
the kind of situations which fall within it and hence the jury's finding 
should be given less weight than in other situations. 
§13.2. Negligence: Crossing accident. In Ladd v. New York) New 
Haven r/:r Hartford R. R./ during a blinding snowstorm an automobile 
in which the plaintiff was a passenger ran into the side of a freight 
train at a crossing not guarded by a flagman or equipped with lights. 
The jury found for the plaintiff. On exceptions, the decision was 
reversed. The decision is amply supported by the Massachusetts cases 
cited in the opinion. 
May it not be suggested that today, when automatic signals - either 
gongs or lights - can be cheaply installed, the Court was perhaps 
too cautious in reversing the verdict and denying liability, since many 
accidents have occurred under substantially the same circumstances.2 
Granting that such an accident would not ordinarily occur without 
negligence on the part of the automobile driver, who would himself 
be barred, such negligence is foreseeable and does not bar the pas-
senger in the absence of the latter's contributory fault.3 Such a de-
cision would not necessarily overrule earlier cases. The existence of 
negligence depends upon the precautions which it is feasible to take at 
the time and place, in view of existing knowledge and the expense 
involved. Cases decided when automatic signals were not common-
place and before experience has indicated that such accidents are not 
uncommon should not be a bar to a jury decision that it is negligent 
not to install them, at least across well-traveled roads. In the present 
case, the road crossing was between Waltham and Maynard and the 
Court could have taken judicial notice of the fact that this is in an 
3 Boomer v. Wilbur, 176 Mass. 482, 57 N.E. 1004 (1899). 
4 Whalen v. Shivek, 326 Mass. 142, 93 N.E.2d 393 (1950). 
§13.2. 1335 Mass. 117, 138 N.E.2d 346 (1956). 
2 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Boston & Albany R.R., 162 Mass. 132, 38 N.E. 366 (1894), 
where the jury was permitted to find the railroad negligent, although it was not 
required to have gates. 
3 Dumas v. Ward, 251 Mass. 497, 146 N.E. 709 (1925); Littlefield v. Gilman, 207 
Mass. 539, 93 N.E. 809 (1911); Chadbourne v. Springfield Street Ry. Co., 199 Mass. 
574,85 N.E. 737 (1908) . 
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area in which there is considerable traffic, a situation always demanding 
greater precautions than those required in remote areas. 
§13.3. Negligence: Duty of possessor of land. In Hannon v. Hayes-
Bickford Lunch System} Inc.? the plaintiff, an employee of an inde-
pendent contractor repairing the defendant's restaurant, was hurt 
when a defective stair gave way. He had noticed the crack in the 
stair but not that the stair was rotten, as one witness testified it was. 
The defendant knew of the rotten condition. After verdict for the 
plaintiff, the trial judge entered judgment for the defendant, which 
the Court affirmed. 
The Court states the almost universal rule that as to static condi-
tion of land the possessor has a duty to a business invitee, including 
his own servants and those of independent contractors, to use care to 
notify them of dangers of which he knows or which reasonable in-
spection would reveal if they are not likely to be discovered by the 
invitee; if, however, the latter discovers the danger, the duty is 
satisfied.2 But the factual conclusion that the plaintiff was aware of 
the danger is somewhat doubtful. As the dissenting opinion notes, 
knowledge of the crack is not necessarily notice of the rottenness. It 
may be, however, that the obviously worn condition of the stairs 
should have put the plaintiff on notice that he should tread lightly. 
The only substantial question was whether the determination of this 
matter was within the province of the jury. 
In De Martin v. New York} New Haven &- Hartford R. R.8 a similar 
problem was involved. The defendant employed an independent con-
tractor to make alterations in its track, which necessitated the reloca-
tion of diesel fuel lines. While the plaintiff, an employee of the con-
tractor, was welding a fuel line he was hurt by an explosion caused 
by the heating of fumes from the residue of fuel in the pipes. The 
plaintiff alleged that he did not know the pipes had contained diesel 
oil and that he had no experience with reference to them. Judgment 
for the plaintiff following a jury verdict was reversed on the ground 
that the defendant's foreman knew what the pipes had been used for 
and that the defendant had no reason to know that the servant of the 
contractor would not know of the prior use, or would not be informed 
of the precautions to be taken. 
These two cases as well as those of Todd v. Wernick4 and Ladd v. 
New York} New Haven &- Hartford R. R./' illustrate the fact that the 
Massachusetts courts are less reluctant than the courts of many other 
states to limit the area within which the jury can exercise its discre-
tion upon matters in which judgment in weighing factors is involved. 
§13.4. Negligence: Res ipsa loquitur. In Weiss v. Republic Pipe 
§13.3. 11957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 919, 145 N.E.2d 191. 
22 Restatement of Torts §§343, 393. 
81957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 911, 143 N.E.2d 542. 
4 See §13.l supra. 
~ See §13.2 supra. 
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and Supply Corp.t the defendant's truckman, while delivering a 750-
pound boiler to the premises of the plaintiff's employer, knotted a 
rope through the top of the boiler and let it down a stairway on skids. 
The knot came untied and the boiler struck the plaintiff, who was 
standing nearby. Judgment n.o.v. was entered for the defendant by 
the trial judge. Judgment for the plaintiff was restored. The Court 
used, without naming it, the familiar, but often abused, doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, deciding properly that the fact that the knot came loose 
is sufficient evidence on which to enable the trier of fact to find 
negligence. This rule has sometimes been misunderstood to change 
the burden of proof,2 whereas it properly means only that the trier of 
fact can find that it is more likely than not that there was negligence. 
Around the rule have grown other errors, such as the rule that the one 
charged with negligence must have been in exclusive control of the 
damaging instrument,3 and a California rule which leads to the 
liability of an entire group, although not acting in concert, if it can 
properly be inferred that one of them was negligent.4 It is better to 
state the result in terms of an inference, as the Supreme Judicial Court 
did in this case, than to employ a phrase made ambiguous by misuse. 
§13.5. Misrepresentation: Deceit. Purely economic interests have 
not been given the protection afforded to the person and to tangible 
property; the action of deceit has not been favored by the courts. 
Thus, although contributory fault is not a defense to an intended 
physical injury, it has been held in many cases that contributory neg-
ligence is a bar to an action of deceit,l and although the defendant has 
been successful in his deceit, it is said that the plaintiff cannot recover 
unless he had a "right to rely" on, or, in other words, if he should 
not have given credence to, the defendant's statement. Likewise it was 
held as late as 1877 that one who knew that others would be deceived 
by his statement was not liable to any of such persons because he did 
not act for the purpose of deceiving him.2 Likewise, a person deceived 
by misleading statements as to future events has been denied recovery, 
even though the defendant had no belief that they would occur.3 
§13.4. l335 Mass. 422, 140 N.E.2d 657 (1957). 
2 Jones v. Shell Petroleum Co., 185 La. 1067, 171 So. 447 (1936). 
8 In Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 46, 68 Sup. Ct. 391, 92 L. Ed. 468 (1948), 
and in Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R.R., 329 U.S. 452, 67 Sup. Ct. 401, 91 L. Ed. 
416 (1947), the injured plaintiff participated in the transaction but the defendant's 
negligence was found to be a permissible inference 
4 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). Two doctors and two 
nurses, one of whom did not see the patient until the day after he was operated 
on, were held liable for an injury which could be found to have been caused by 
an act of negligence at some time during or following the operation. 
§13.5. 1 In Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 124 N.E.2d 912 (1954), the Court, 
after noting a number of such Massachusetts cases (pp. 372, 373), reached the 
proper conclusion that a rogue should not be protected because his victim was a 
fool, and overruled the earlier cases. 
2 Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873). 
8 Alropa Co. v. Flatley, 226 Wis. 561, 277 N.W. 108 (1938). This case involved 
a representation by a seller of land that a canal and a highway would be con-
4
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Even a statement of present intent has been held not to be the basis 
of an action of deceit, since it necessarily looks to the future. 4 State-
ments made by a seller as to the value of his property, including 
statements of the price paid and offers received, have been found to be 
only seller's talk.5 Finally, in most states there is no action of tort 
for a negligent statement of fact, intended by the defendant to be relied 
upon, in a bargaining transaction, even though it gives a profit to the 
defendant and a loss to the plaintiff.6 
As indicated in footnotes I and 5 of this section, the Supreme 
Judicial Court has now adopted a policy which keeps it abreast of 
modern thought, and the four cases reported below recognize and are 
in accord with that policy. 
In Bellefeuille v. Medeiros 7 it was held that, in an action to rescind 
a sale, a statement by the seller of a manufacturing business that he 
could and would obtain cloth for the manufacture of bags at a speci-
fied price was properly held to be a statement of present facts, e.g., 
that there was cloth available which he would obtain; and since this 
was a bill for rescission, the action was allowed without proof that 
the defendant knew the falsity of his statement. This case is also 
interesting because rescission was granted in spite of the fact that 
the complainant could not return the entire property received, since 
he had sold some of it;8 and because the damages were not the deceit 
damages but the difference between the value of what he got and 
what he gave, as is proper in an action for restitution resulting from 
rescission. 
In Gaiotti v. United States Trust Co.9 the plaintiff asked the de-
fendant for a letter of credit to finance the purchase of bananas, the 
document to contain a clause by which liability would be dependent 
upon the condition of the fruit. The defendant promised to add 
the clause but did not, and the plaintiff had to pay for bananas which 
were not in accordance with the agreement of purchase. In an action 
of deceit, judgment was properly for the defendant. The Court 
recognized that a promise given without intent to perform may be 
the basis of action, but could find no evidence as to the intent not to 
structed along the land. It was decided partly on the ground that the buyer could 
have ascertained the facts. Obviously any statement as to the future contains some 
representation of present facts which would normally lead to the event. 
4 Gallagher & Bacon v. BruneI, 6 Cow. 346 (N.Y. 1826). 
5 See, e.g., the Massachusetts cases cited in Kabatchnik v. Hanover·Elm Bldg. Co., 
328 Mass. 341, 343, 345, 103 N.E.2d 692, 693, 694 (1951), which overruled them. 
6 Nash v. Minnesota Title & Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574, 40 N.E. 1039 (1894). 
New Hampshire allows such an action. Weston v. Brown, 82 N.H. 157, 131 Atl. 141 
(1925). So does New York, within limits. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 
N.E. 275 (1922); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 
441 (1931). As to Massachusetts, see text at note 11 infra. 
7335 Mass. 262, 139 N.E.2d 413 (1957). 
8 Restatement of Restitution §§65, 66. 
9335 Mass. 496, 140 N.E.2d 449 (1957). 
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perform other than the mere non-performance. It may be assumed 
that a court might well find that a "mere" non-performance is enough 
if it comes almost immediately upon the promise, as where one 
promises not to leave a room and he promptly vacates. But there 
could be no such inference in this case. It does not appear why the 
plaintiff sought relief in a tort action; it would seem that he had a 
contract claim unless barred by the exculpatory clause in the applica-
tion for the letter of credit. 
In Sandler v. Elliott,lO an action for fraud in the sale of a franchise, 
the Court renews its previous statements that lack of diligence by the 
plaintiff to ascertain the truth is not a defense to an action of deceit. 
It also properly held that there was sufficient reliance upon which the 
action could be maintained, even though the misrepresentations were 
not the sole or even the predominant factor in the plaintiff's decision 
to take the franchise. 
Reservoir Manor Corp. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty CoP 
arose on demurrer. The second count alleged that the defendant had 
inspected the plaintiff's boiler and had reported that under a hydro-
static test the boiler had proved to be safe for operation; that in 
reliance upon the untrue report the plaintiff had continued to use 
the boiler to the breaking point. Recovery was denied on this count, 
since there was no allegation of a duty to inspect or of a duty to act. 
It is suggested that, irrespective of the existence of a duty to act, 
liability should have been found because of a negligent statement relied 
on by the plaintiff, causing physical harm to the chattel,l2 Further, 
even if this is dealt with as an action of deceit which causes merely 
economic harm, at least it is arguable that since the inspection by 
hydrostatic test was a matter within the peculiar knowledge of the 
defendant, the case would fall within the Massachusetts rule that 
where one states as in his own knowledge something which is not true, I 
he is guilty of fraud.13 
10335 Mass. 576, 141 N.E.2d 367 (1957). 
11334 Mass. 620, 137 N.E.2d 912 (1956). 
12 See 2 Restatement of Torts §311. 
13 Massachusetts and some other states have a rule which in certain situations 
imposes liability upon an honest person. See Wire & Textile Machinery, Inc. v. 
Robinson, 332 Mass. 417, 125 N.E.2d 403 (1955). The case establishing the doctrine 
was Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, 18 N.E. 168 (1888). In that 
case the defendant sold land, representing that it contained iron ore. His statement 
was based upon the report of a surveyor who stated that, if indications proved to 
be correct, there was iron on the land. The defendant's statement was honest but 
he had forgotten that the report had not been verified. Recovery was allowed on 
the ground that the defendant stated of his own knowledge a fact to which he once 
knew that he did not know, and that forgetfulness after former knowledge does 
not excuse a statement of actual knowledge. This doctrine was perpetuated by 
the dictum in Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 374, 124 N.E.2d 912, 916 (1954). "In 
this Commonwealth, where the rule is stricter than that in many jurisdictions, a 
false though innocent representation of a fact made as of one's own knowledge may 
be the basis of liability." 
6
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§13.6 
§13.6. Liability for defamation. Chapter 378 of the Acts of 1957 
amends G.L., c. 231 by adding Section 91A, providing tha.t the opera-
tives and employees of a radio or television station shall not be liable 
for defamatory statements of persons whose utterances are not subject 
to censorship or control by the station. At present there is doubt as 
to whether the operator of a radio or television station is held strictly 
liable for defamation committed by one not in its employment.1 There 
are no Massachusetts cases on this point. The operator is liable if he 
should know of the likelihood of defamation and does not censor it. 
It is unfair to subject the station to liability for words which it is 
unable to prevent. Even under this statute a station permitting polit-
ical speeches may have to use care in determining whether it has the 
power of censorship. Thus, in Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations 2 
it was held that only the speech of a candidate for office came within 
the censorship provision of the Federal Communications Act, and 
that the station was liable for uncensored defamation by supporters 
of candidates. 
C. RESOLVES LOOKING TO LEGISLATION 
§13.7. Damages for causing death. Chapter 28 of the Resolves of 
1957 asks for an investigation into the question of the amount of 
damages for negligently causing death, now limited to $20,000. That 
this should be done would seem to be obvious if the damages for 
tortiously causing physical harm continue to be unlimited. Consid-
ering present purchasing power, the statutory maximum for causing 
death obviously is inadequate to provide for dependents of the victim. 
It may be suggested that the present method of assessing damages, 
based wholly on the degree of the defendant's fault and without ref-
erence to the plaintiff's loss, should also be changed to a compensatory 
basis, the rule in all but one of the other American states. 
§13.8. Contributory negligence. Chapter 32 of the Resolves of 
1957 is a resolve looking to the adoption of the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence. This is a perennial. There are a number of state 
statutes mitigating the defense of contributory negligence, such as 
those in Nebraska 1 and Mississippi,2 which provide that contributory 
fault shall not be a complete defense if the plaintiff's negligence was 
slight and the defendant's negligence gross. The Wisconsin statute 3 
permits a diminished recovery if the plaintiff's fault and responsibility 
for his harm were less than those of the defendant. It may be sug-
§13.6. 1 Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948). 
2186 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1950). 
§13.8. 1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-1151 (1943). 
2 Miss. Code §1454 (1942). 
a Wis. Stat. §331.045 (1953). 
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gested that if a comparative negligence statute is adopted, it should 
include the loss to both parties, dividing this either in two equal parts 
(for ease in administration) or in proportion to fault. It seems obvious 
that such a result is fairer than the present rule, which throws the 
entire loss upon one of the negligent parties. The last clear chance 
rule, as ordinarily interpreted, does not mitigate this result, since it 
throws the loss upon one who may have been guilty of less, although 
later, negligence. With a comparative negligence statute, there would 
probably be an increased number of actions brought. As to its effect 
upon liability insurance rates, it is difficult to tell in advance whether 
the increased number of actions brought would offset the smaller 
judgments obtained. 
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